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Security Council

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Report of the Security Council mission to Central Africa, 4 to 11 November 2005

I. Introduction

1. In his letter dated 27 October 2005 (S/2005/682), the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General that the members of the Council had decided to send a mission to Central Africa from 4 to 11 November 2005, which would be led by Jean-Marc de La Sablière. Following consultations among the members of the Council, it was agreed that the composition of the mission should be as follows:

Ambassador Jean-Marc de La Sablière (France), head of mission

Ambassador Abdallah Baali (Algeria)

Ambassador Alberto D'Alotto (Argentina)

Ambassador Simon Bodéhoussè Idohou (Benin)

Ms. Irene Vida Gala (Brazil)

Mr. Cheng Jingye (China)

Ambassador Ellen Margrethe Løj (Denmark)

Ambassador Adamantios Th. Vassilakis (Greece)

Ambassador Kenzo Oshima (Japan)

Ambassador Lauro L. Baja (Philippines)

Ambassador Mihnea I. Motoc (Romania)

Ambassador Alexander V. Konuzin (Russian Federation)

Mr. Justin McKenzie Smith (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)

Ambassador Augustine P. Mahiga (United Republic of Tanzania)

Mr. William Brencick (United States of America)

2. The terms of reference of the mission are annexed to document S/2005/682.

Note: A list of abbreviations used in the present report appears at the end of the document.

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3. The Council mission left New York on 4 November and returned on 11 November. During that period, the mission visited Kinshasa, Mbuji-Mayi and Kamina in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Bujumbura, Kigali, Entebbe (Uganda) and Dar es Salaam. The mission met with the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Joseph Kabila, the President of Burundi, Pierre Nkurunziza, the President of Uganda, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, the President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, and the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Benjamin Mkapa.

4. The mission also met in Kinshasa with the four Vice-Presidents of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, separately; the Presidents the National Assembly and the Senate; the Chairman and members of the standing committee of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and the Chairman of the Media High Authority; the Joint Commission on Security Sector Reform; representatives of civil society and religious organizations; a group of women ministers and parliamentarians; and the International Committee in Support of the Transition (CIAT). The head of the mission also held informal discussions with the leadership of the opposition political party, the Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social (UDPS).

5. The mission met in Mbuji-Mayi with the Governor of Kasai Oriental Province, the local representative of IEC and members of the Provincial Security Committee. The mission also visited the military base of Kamina (Katanga Province), where it received a comprehensive briefing on the military integration process in the presence of the Minister of Defence, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), the coordinator of the Military Integration Structure, the chairman of the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion, and the head of the European Union Mission of Assistance for Security Sector Reform (EUSEC).

6. In Bujumbura, the mission met with President Pierre Nkurunziza and held consultations with a Government delegation led by the Minister of External Relations and Cooperation. The mission also met with the leadership of the main political parties represented in Parliament: the Front pour la démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU), the Union pour le progrès national (UPRONA) and the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie — Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (CNN-FDD). The head of the mission met informally with the former Head of State, Domitien Ndayizeye. Members of the mission also met with civil society organizations working on transitional justice and judicial reform.

7. The mission was briefed in Kinshasa, Mbuji-Mayi and Kamina by the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and in Bujumbura by the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB). The mission was accompanied by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, William Lacy Swing, in Kinshasa, Mbuji-Mayi, Kamina, Entebbe and Kigali, while the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Burundi, Carolyn McAskie, accompanied the mission in Bujumbura, Entebbe, Kigali and Dar es Salaam.

8. In Dar es Salaam, the mission met with President Mkapa, and with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The mission also received briefings from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, Ibrahima Fall, and from the Chairman of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ibra Déguène Ka. The mission met with United Nations agencies and non-

governmental organizations based in the United Republic of Tanzania to discuss the issue of refugees, and with the academic community of Dar es Salaam.

9. The sixth mission of the Security Council to Central Africa took place at a time when the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has entered a new phase and the recent completion of the transition in Burundi has unveiled a variety of challenges to the consolidation of peace. Voter registration is under way in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in preparation for the holding of a constitutional referendum on 18 December, and for legislative and presidential elections to be completed before the end of the transitional period, on 30 June 2006. Meanwhile, the installation in September 2005 of a democratically elected Government in Burundi inaugurated the post-transitional phase, which will require the continued support of the international community.

II. Democratic Republic of the Congo

10. One of the key objectives of the Security Council mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was to observe at first hand the progress made in the peace and transition process, particularly with regard to elections, security sector reform, the disarmament of foreign and Congolese armed groups, the extension of State authority and the establishment of the rule of law. The Council noted that there had been a number of positive developments since its last visit, in November 2004.

11. Notwithstanding delays and immense logistical difficulties, the outcome of voter registration is encouraging. As at 7 November, over 20 million voters had registered. The Transitional Government has approved the draft electoral law, which it submitted to the Parliament on 7 November, while the mission was in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

12. While there is an urgent need for a thorough reform in the administration and management of the armed forces, there have been delays in the *brassage* process and in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of Congolese combatants. The Transitional Government also faces considerable difficulties in the delivery of regular support to integrated FARDC brigades deployed in operational theatres in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Progress has however been made in advancing the restructuring and reform of FARDC. Six integrated brigades have been trained and deployed to the Provinces of North and South Kivu and the Ituri district (Province Orientale).

Political transition

13. President Kabila and the four Vice-Presidents emphasized that much had been achieved in advancing the transitional process, particularly with regard to the objective agreed to in the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, signed on 17 December 2002, of organizing free, democratic and credible elections before the end of the transitional period.

14. It did not prove possible for the mission to meet jointly with the five-member *espace présidentiel*. The President and four Vice-Presidents nevertheless stressed that their relationship had improved since the installation of the Government of National Unity and Transition, and that in spite of the forthcoming electoral campaign they maintained an open dialogue with one another.

15. At an informal meeting, the UDPS leader, Etienne Tshisekedi, presented a memorandum to the head of the Security Council mission, indicating the party's willingness to join the transitional process. At the same time, UDPS called for the establishment of a dialogue including all of the political forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to evaluate the transition and revise its framework as appropriate.

16. President Kabila and the four Vice-Presidents acknowledged that inclusive elections would enhance the credibility of the process and ensure the legitimacy of the future government. They expressed their readiness to engage in an open dialogue with all political stakeholders, including UDPS. They stressed, however, that any discussion on the way forward should be guided by the present electoral time line, as well as by the principles of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement. They called on the leadership of UDPS to make public its commitment to participate in and accept the results of the elections.

17. While recalling that the Council was not involved in the domestic politics of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the mission highlighted the merits of an inclusive process and encouraged the parties concerned to work in that spirit. The mission insisted that the time frame of the transition must be respected. The mission also stressed the need for the Government to create the socio-economic and political conditions that would ensure stability in the post-transitional period. President Kabila noted in this regard that a dialogue between the various Congolese political forces was ongoing.

18. The mission was informed by many of its interlocutors that corruption in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remained serious. One area of particular concern was the payment of salaries to the military. It was widely acknowledged that addressing this issue was also critical for the economic recovery of the country and the stability of an elected government. While the Transitional Government informed the Council that it had taken measures in this regard, including administrative sanctions and judicial proceedings against individuals found guilty of acts of corruption, it was acknowledged that impunity remained a major factor in the continuation of mismanagement practices, and that it was impossible to recover mishandled funds.

19. President Kabila stressed the determination of the Transitional Government to fight corruption. He also noted that after many years of widespread economic mismanagement it would take time for the Democratic Republic of the Congo to make significant progress. The mission encouraged its interlocutors to work closely and constructively with CIAT and other relevant international stakeholders in order to obtain every possible assistance needed to address this important issue.

20. The mission's interlocutors also agreed on the need to strengthen the capacity of the Congolese judiciary to tackle impunity, particularly as it relates to economic mismanagement and human rights violations.

Electoral process

21. All of the mission's interlocutors expressed their gratitude for the support the Democratic Republic of the Congo was receiving from the international community and MONUC, and in particular for their technical and logistical assistance for the elections.

22. The mission came away with the strong impression of overwhelming popular support and of high expectations for the elections, which will be the first in 40 years and are largely perceived by the Congolese people as a means of bringing about positive change.

23. While recognizing that the organization of the referendum and the subsequent polls would be a major logistical challenge, which could put pressure on the electoral calendar, all of the leaders of the transition and stakeholders reaffirmed their commitment to follow the electoral time line with a view to the successful and timely completion of the transitional process.

24. The mission reiterated the strong support of the Security Council for the electoral process and welcomed the high population turnout for voter registration. The mission underscored the need for the Congolese authorities to adhere strictly to the electoral time line, stressing that all the polls should be held before the end of the transitional period on 30 June 2006.

25. The mission stressed that the electoral process must not only respect the deadlines and remain credible, but also meet the expectations of the Congolese people, who had been demonstrating their eagerness to participate and freely elect their leaders. The mission also encouraged stakeholders in Kinshasa and Mbuji-Mayi to make further efforts regarding the inclusion of women in the political and electoral processes.

26. The mission further called upon its interlocutors to accelerate the review and adoption of the electoral law. President Kabila assured the mission that the electoral law would be considered by Parliament expeditiously. The law would be reviewed article by article, so that it could be voted and promulgated immediately after the referendum scheduled for 18 December 2005. The Government transmitted the law to the Parliament on 7 November, during the Council's visit to Kinshasa. At the same time, the mission's interlocutors expressed confidence in finding consensus on the principles of the electoral law, including on proportional representation for the election of the legislative body. Differences, however, remain regarding the size of electoral districts.

27. The Security Council mission stressed the need for the establishment of a level playing field during elections, including (1) the need to ensure that registration is conducted fairly in all provinces; (b) the opening of the political arena to all of the Congolese political forces; and (c) the provision of guarantees regarding freedom of expression. The mission called on the transitional authorities to ensure the impartiality of the public media during the electoral period. In this regard, the mission took note of the Media High Authority's efforts to address recent instances of "hate media" and its concerns regarding the regulation of the private media before and during the electoral campaign. Additional efforts are also required in the area of civic education, to improve popular understanding of the draft constitution and polling modalities.

28. The mission noted that challenges remained regarding the completion of voter registration in the Provinces of Bandundu and Equateur. Difficulties include voter sensitization and the opening of some 40,000 polling sites in time for the holding of the constitutional referendum on 18 December, and the organization of subsequent polls before 30 June 2006. The mission encouraged IEC to make every effort to address those challenges, including the training and deployment of some 200,000

electoral personnel and the establishment of security for elections. The mission was also made aware of the constraints and logistical challenges faced by MONUC in assisting IEC, including difficulties in securing air assets and the required personnel.

29. At the same time, the mission was encouraged that IEC, with the logistical support of MONUC, had commenced the pre-positioning of electoral material for the referendum, as well as the training of electoral personnel.

30. In Mbuji-Mayi, during the mission's visit, peaceful pro-UDPS demonstrations were staged, which did not affect the work of the mission but showed the involvement of local populations in the political process. The mission welcomed the strong commitment of the local authorities in that regard. Seventy-two per cent of the estimated electorate in Kasai Oriental had registered to vote.

31. The mission's interlocutors in Mbuji-Mayi indicated that the local police capacity, which is being strengthened with MONUC assistance, would be in a position to provide adequate security during the elections. The police however lacked basic equipment. Some concern was expressed regarding the time frame for the referendum, which would be held on only one day, as gaining access to a majority of the polling stations in the province would in some places require populations to travel for a significant number of days.

32. The mission was reminded that the main challenges facing people in Mbuji-Mayi, a city of 3 million inhabitants, were of a socio-economic nature, as they lacked basic services, including water and electricity, and benefited little from the substantial mining revenue generated by the exploitation of diamonds around the city.

Security issues

33. The Security Council mission insisted that progress in security sector reform was critical to the immediate and long-term stability of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in particular with regard to a continuation of operations aimed at the disarmament and repatriation of foreign armed groups. The mission's interlocutors stressed that the continued presence of such armed groups in the eastern part of the country was mostly a problem for the Congolese people, particularly as those groups harassed and committed serious human rights violations against local populations.

34. The Transitional Government highlighted its determination to carry through the disarmament and repatriation of all of the foreign armed groups present on its territory. It stressed that there was a need to reinforce the capacity of FARDC in that regard.

35. At the military base of Kamina, the mission received a comprehensive briefing on the efforts made and the challenges faced by the Transitional Government in advancing the process of integration of the armed forces. The mission took note of the Government's intention to stand up and deploy to the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo a total of nine integrated brigades, before April 2006, to conduct offensive operations against foreign armed groups, with MONUC support. A joint FARDC-MONUC-EUSEC operational directive had been prepared for that purpose. Government and MONUC interlocutors, however, stressed that FARDC faced logistical difficulties in supporting its units once deployed, and called for more direct international support in that regard.

36. While acknowledging the progress made by the Democratic Republic of the Congo in completing the training and deployment of six integrated brigades to the eastern part of the country, the mission expressed concern at the irregular payment of salaries to military and police personnel, which contributed to insecurity, as unpaid soldiers and police personnel lived off local populations.

37. The mission encouraged the Transitional Government to adopt the recommendations of the EUSEC report on reform of FARDC, including the completion of the census of military personnel which had been conducted with the assistance of South Africa, and the establishment of transparent and reliable mechanisms to ensure the regular payment of salaries to military personnel and improve their welfare. President Kabila indicated that the High Defence Council would shortly adopt the recommendations of the EUSEC report, albeit with some amendments.

38. The mission also expressed its concern regarding delays in the launching of the second wave of military integration, which should lead to the training and deployment of three additional integrated Congolese brigades before the end of 2005. Members of the Transitional Government indicated that the delays were largely attributable to the lack of candidates for military integration, as up to 60 per cent of the former combatants concerned by the second wave of military integration had chosen to join the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. The Government would make additional efforts to encourage the enrolment of former combatants in the military.

39. Regarding the cooperation among States in the region, President Kabila expressed the continuing interest of the Transitional Government in the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. He indicated, however, that the Government had requested a postponement of the second summit of the Conference, previously scheduled for 15 and 16 December in Nairobi, as the proposed dates would have coincided with the beginning of the electoral period.

III. Burundi

40. The Security Council mission visited Bujumbura on 8 and 9 November. The mission warmly congratulated the people and Government of Burundi for the successful conduct of the electoral process and the peaceful transfer of authority to an elected Government. The mission encouraged all stakeholders to continue to work together in a spirit of dialogue and consensus, and to respect the principle of power-sharing enshrined in the Constitution. The mission also noted the challenges facing the Government in the post-transitional period in its efforts to consolidate peace.

41. The mission was informed by the Government of Burundi of its internal and external priorities for the future. The mission underscored the continued commitment of the international community, and of the United Nations in particular, to assist the Burundian authorities in consolidating the achievements of the peace process. The mission also suggested that Burundi could benefit greatly from the support of the peacebuilding commission once it was established. It looks forward to the continuation of constructive dialogue between the Government of Burundi and its international partners.

42. The Government of Burundi noted that reconstruction, development, good governance, human rights and the return of refugees from neighbouring countries were its key priorities. The Government envisages a role for the United Nations primarily in reconstruction and development assistance, and suggested that the peacekeeping component of the United Nations could be gradually reduced, as security had returned to a major part of the country, with the exception of the western provinces of Bubanza, Bujumbura Rural and Cibitoke, where the operations of the Palipehutu-FNL rebellion and movements of other armed groups and weapons smuggling remained issues of concern.

43. The mission noted with due regard the Government's approach concerning the international community's support for its efforts in this new phase of consolidation. The mission, however, cautioned against an untimely disengagement of peacekeepers, as that had led in similar situations to a weakening of the overall security and political situation. The mission was reassured by the Government's agreement to review carefully, with the United Nations, the modalities for the expected disengagement of ONUB, which it agreed should be gradual. Burundi's main political parties, CNDD-FDD, FRODEBU and UPRONA, also expressed their support for a gradual disengagement of ONUB, in particular its military component.

44. With regard to the issue of justice and reconciliation, President Nkurunziza indicated that the Government had just appointed a committee to negotiate with the United Nations the modalities for the establishment of a truth commission and a special chamber within the Burundian judiciary, pursuant to resolution 1606 (2005). An association of non-governmental organizations known as "Transitional Justice" called for the establishment of a special chamber with international status to judge those responsible for the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed since 1972.

45. The mission expressed concern at the increase in insecurity and attacks on civilians, reportedly caused by Palipehutu-FNL, led by Agathon Rwasa. President Nkurunziza informed the Council that, despite the signing of a declaration on cessation of hostilities, repeated efforts to bring Palipehutu-FNL into the peace process, including recent attempts by the United Republic of Tanzania to resume negotiations, had failed. He expressed his disappointment at the lack of response by FNL and noted that, should FNL continue to threaten the security of Burundi and its people, the Government would have no alternative but to take decisive measures against the group. The President stressed, however, that the Government remained open to negotiations with FNL, should it demonstrate a willingness to engage in a constructive dialogue on entering the political process.

46. President Nkurunziza noted that a regional approach to ensuring peace and security in the Great Lakes region should be encouraged. He mentioned the proposal of the Tripartite Plus One Joint Commission to strengthen the mandate of MONUC, allowing for the forcible disarmament of foreign armed groups operating in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, including FNL, which he noted continued to use the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo as a rear base. President Nkurunziza also expressed support for the convening of the summit of the Great Lakes Conference.

47. Concerning the domestic political process, Burundi's main opposition parties urged the Council to remain vigilant regarding the implementation, by the Government, of the constitutional provisions on power-sharing. The leaders of

FRODEBU and UPRONA, while confirming their readiness to work within the elected institutions, expressed concern about what they perceived as an attempt by the Government to exclude them from the political process. President Nkurunziza acknowledged that the Government faced difficulties in reconciling its commitment to downsize the public administration with the constitutional requirements for the inclusion of Burundi's 36 political parties at all levels of Government. The Government would, however, make every effort to ensure that all of the country's political parties were represented in the administration, as appropriate.

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48. In Kinshasa and Bujumbura, the mission was briefed on the actions MONUC and ONUB had taken to address cases and allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse over the past year. The mission welcomed their efforts in addressing the issue, and took note of the fact that, effective October 2005, the Office for Internal Oversight Services had taken over investigative functions regarding sexual abuse and exploitation and that MONUC had now focused its efforts on preventive measures, training and policy planning. The mission encouraged MONUC and ONUB to continue their efforts in that regard.

49. The mission discussed resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security, in Kinshasa with non-governmental organizations and women members of Parliament, and in Bujumbura with the ONUB gender adviser.

50. The head of mission was also briefed on the efforts undertaken by MONUC and ONUB regarding child protection. He encouraged them, in their upcoming reports on the implementation of resolution 1612 (2005), to suggest practical improvements that could be envisaged and to indicate the difficulties they faced in the performance of their mandate.

IV. Regional relations

51. On 9 November, the mission met with Presidents Museveni and Kagame in Entebbe and Kigali, respectively. It briefed them on its visits to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi. The mission expressed its satisfaction with the successful transition in Burundi, and welcomed the recent progress in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly with regard to the upcoming elections. The meetings focused on a discussion of security issues in the region.

52. In both Kigali and Kampala, the mission reiterated the concern of the Security Council regarding the continued presence of foreign armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. In that regard, it underlined the importance of supporting and reinforcing the integration of FARDC, so as to enable it to tackle those armed groups robustly, with MONUC support. The deployment in recent months to Ituri, and subsequently to the Kivus, of several FARDC integrated brigades had allowed it to engage the armed groups. The planned deployment of additional FARDC forces in those areas should add to the military pressure upon those groups.

53. Both President Museveni and President Kagame welcomed progress in voter registration in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and expressed support for the electoral process. They agreed that successful elections in the Democratic Republic

of the Congo would contribute to its internal stability, which was in the interest of the region. They added, however, that the establishment of regional stability would also require the resolution of the issue of the presence and activities of the Ugandan and Rwandan armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, as they continued to pose a threat not only to the Congolese civilian population but to their countries also.

54. President Museveni reiterated the call of the Tripartite Plus One Joint Commission that the Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda (FDLR) should be disarmed by force. He also called for closer cooperation between the United Nations and States in the region. He suggested that the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) be allowed to conduct joint operations with FARDC and MONUC, in particular should elements of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) again enter the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and that liaison officers be exchanged between UPDF, MONUC and FARDC.

55. President Kagame insisted that MONUC conduct operations against FDLR in North and South Kivu, as robustly as against Congolese militias in Ituri. The mission also discussed with President Kagame means for the Government of Rwanda to strengthen the incentives it currently offers to FDLR to encourage its combatants voluntarily to disarm and be repatriated and reintegrated into Rwandan society.

56. The mission highlighted its grave concerns over the humanitarian situation in northern Uganda, as well as the recent attacks on humanitarian workers and the security challenges faced by aid agencies in accessing areas in need of urgent relief. President Museveni indicated to the mission that LRA had been defeated. Small remnant LRA groups, however, were still active and continued to contribute to insecurity in northern Uganda. He reiterated his willingness and the determination of the Government of Uganda to continue to take measures to provide security for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and relief.

57. The mission encouraged the Government of Uganda to expedite the implementation of the arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court for five LRA leaders, while not excluding the possibility of finding a peaceful solution for other elements of LRA. It also urged the Government to extend further the amnesty for rank-and-file LRA combatants and to assist their integration into their communities.

58. During the discussion with President Museveni, the mission emphasized that the use of force on the territory of a foreign State, without the latter's consent, would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations.

59. The mission expressed its concerns over reports of continuing violations of the arms embargo imposed on the Democratic Republic of the Congo by the Security Council. It urged the Governments of Uganda and Rwanda to improve their cooperation with the Group of Experts established under resolution 1533 (2004). It also urged them to reinforce existing measures to prevent and deny the entry of arms into the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo through their respective territories.

60. The mission reminded its interlocutors of the link between the existence of armed groups, arms trafficking and the illegal exploitation of natural resources. The mission also reminded President Museveni and President Kagame of the Security

Council's call on States in the region to prevent the continuation of trafficking in natural resources in their respective territories.

61. Both President Museveni and President Kagame stated that, to their knowledge, no arms had entered the Democratic Republic of the Congo from their territories. President Museveni questioned the investigative approach of the United Nations in monitoring the situation. He offered to explore additional means of strengthening controls at Uganda's borders with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Government of Rwanda informed the mission that it had established an inter-ministerial committee to monitor the implementation of the embargo on its territory and to strengthen Rwanda's cooperation with the Group of Experts.

62. The mission subsequently received a briefing from the Chairman of the Group of Experts on its activities since the publication by the sanctions committee on 1 November of a list of individuals and entities subject to sanctions under resolution 1596 (2005). The mission encouraged the group to continue its investigations, the scope of which will be extended to include embargo violations that may occur from within the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The mission also highlighted the importance for all States concerned in the region to cooperate fully with the work of the Group of Experts.

63. On 10 November, the mission met in Dar es Salaam with President Mkapa and Foreign Minister Kikwete. Discussions centred on the peace processes in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Members of the mission paid tribute to the role of the United Republic of Tanzania in supporting and facilitating both processes. The mission briefed the President and Foreign Minister on the outcome of its visits to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda.

64. The mission received detailed briefings on recent efforts by the United Republic of Tanzania to facilitate dialogue between the Government of Burundi and Palipehutu-FNL, as mandated by the regional initiative for peace in Burundi. President Mkapa noted that mistrust between the two parties remained high. The failure of FNL to pursue contacts with either the Government of Burundi or that of the United Republic of Tanzania was disappointing. President Mkapa stressed, however, that both Governments remained open to negotiations.

65. Tanzanian authorities shared the mission's concerns regarding the security situation in Burundi, including the risks that might arise from an untimely withdrawal of ONUB. They highlighted the need for any disengagement of ONUB to be cautious and gradual. Such an approach would help in providing guarantees for the long-term consolidation of peace in Burundi. Both the President and the Foreign Minister called for additional support for the integration process of the Burundian army.

66. President Mkapa and Foreign Minister Kikwete expressed support for the transition and welcomed recent progress in the electoral process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. They highlighted the need for the elections to be credible, including through the strengthening of IEC, as that would ensure stability after the completion of the transition. They emphasized that voter education and the commitment of all of the political forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo were key components of credibility.

67. The mission's interlocutors expressed concern at the continuing insecurity in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and called for rapid and firm collective action against the foreign armed groups present in that region.

68. President Mkapa reiterated his country's commitment to continue cooperating with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in support of the voluntary return of the Burundian and Congolese refugees present in the United Republic of Tanzania. The mission was briefed by United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations on the process thus far and the challenges faced.

69. President Mkapa and the Foreign Minister looked forward to the timely convening of the summit of the Great Lakes Conference.

70. In Dar es Salaam, the Security Council mission also met with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, Ibrahima Fall. Noting that the Conference had provided a forum for countries in the region to peacefully discuss issues of common concern, the Special Representative stressed that a significant postponement of the summit would affect the momentum of the process. He suggested that the Security Council urge countries in the region to maintain that momentum. In the meantime, the draft protocols, including the protocol on peace and security, adoption of which was expected at the ministerial-level meeting scheduled for mid-February, would be strengthened and finalized. The mission highlighted the need for participating countries to prioritize the expected outcomes of the Conference, including a reduction of the number of projects, with a view to achieving meaningful results. The Special Representative indicated that the current selection of projects and protocols reflected consensus on the priorities for each of the main themes of the Conference.

71. In the meeting at the University of Dar es Salaam, teachers and students discussed the regional situation with members of the mission and urged the Security Council to increase its involvement in Africa.

V. Recommendations to the Security Council

72. The mission recommends that the Security Council consider the following actions.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

1. Encourage the Parliament to review the draft electoral law on an accelerated basis and approve the law in advance article by article before the referendum, so that it can be adopted immediately after the referendum.

2. Urge the Government and Parliament to ensure that the electoral law is clear, comprehensive and easy for the electorate to understand.

3. Call upon the Congolese authorities and all political actors to ensure the holding of free, fair, transparent and democratic elections, as provided for by the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement, before the end of the transitional period on 30 June 2006.

4. Encourage the Government to publish an electoral timetable as soon as possible.

5. Invite the Government to increase civic education and voter sensitization activities, particularly among women, to ensure widespread public understanding regarding the draft constitution, the voting system and the electoral process.

6. Encourage the Government and IEC to take the necessary measures to ensure that voter registration is conducted fairly in all of the provinces, including by extending registration time lines, as appropriate, to ensure that registration rates in all of the provinces are commensurate.

7. Encourage IEC to take the necessary measures to ensure freedom of expression and equal access to impartial public media during the electoral campaign.

8. Invite the Congolese authorities to facilitate the deployment of independent international and national electoral observers throughout the country.

9. Urge all stakeholders, in particular the Media High Authority, to deter hate messages and incitements to violence, in particular during the electoral period.

10. Encourage the Transitional Government to engage FDLR and urge it to disarm and repatriate to Rwanda. The Transitional Government should in this regard ensure that all possible steps are taken to strengthen the capacity of FARDC.

11. Urge the Transitional Government to expedite the adoption by the High Defence Council and the implementation by relevant Congolese authorities of reforms based on the recommendations contained in the EUSEC report, in particular with regard to the transparent and regular payment of salaries.

12. Urge the Transitional Government to implement without further delay the second phase of the integration process.

13. Encourage MONUC to continue to support the actions taken by FARDC to step up the pressure on foreign armed groups operating in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

14. Encourage the international community to increase its assistance for the formation, training and equipment of FARDC integrated brigades and of the national police.

15. Encourage the Transitional Government to ensure that those responsible for abuses of human rights are brought to justice without delay, in particular leaders of armed groups.

16. Urge the Transitional Government to take all necessary steps to end incidents of human rights abuses by military and police personnel and to bring to justice those responsible.

17. Encourage the Transitional Government to make progress on building the capacity of the judiciary.

18. Urge the international community to assist the Government in ensuring transparent economic management. Urge the Government to participate fully in the regular meetings of the *espace présidentiel* and CIAT on this issue.

Uganda

19. Call upon the Government to respect fully the sovereignty of neighbouring States and in particular to refrain from any use of force outside its borders.

20. Urge the Government to take further measures to ensure that remnant militias operating in the Ituri district receive no support from Ugandan territory.

21. Encourage the Government to cooperate with the efforts of the United Nations towards resolving the continued threat to regional security posed by the presence of foreign armed groups on Congolese territory.

22. Encourage the Government and MONUC, in cooperation with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to study the possibility of exchanging liaison officers where advisable.

23. Urge the Government to ensure that the arms embargo imposed by the Security Council on the Democratic Republic of the Congo is respected and enforced on its territory, in particular by establishing stricter controls at its borders with the Democratic Republic of the Congo to curtail the illegal cross-border trafficking of natural resources and arms and the movement of combatants.

24. Urge the Government to improve its cooperation with the Group of Experts with a view to facilitating the implementation of its mandate.

25. Encourage the Government to continue to take all necessary steps to protect civilians in northern Uganda and provide security for the provision of humanitarian assistance, including through the reinforcement of military and police deployments.

26. Encourage the Government to offer positive incentives for LRA combatants to lay down their arms, including effective reintegration programmes.

27. Encourage the Ugandan authorities to explore all ways and means of resolving the conflict in the north of the country, including the extension of the amnesty law to members of LRA who are not indicted by the International Criminal Court for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.

Rwanda

28. Encourage the Government to cooperate with the efforts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Nations to resolve the continued threat to regional security posed by the presence of foreign armed groups on Congolese territory.

29. Encourage the Government to reaffirm publicly all the commitments taken in regard to promoting the return of FDLR to Rwanda, including its commitment not to prosecute any returning ex-combatant under 25 years of age.

30. Urge the Government to ensure that the arms embargo imposed by the Security Council on the Democratic Republic of the Congo is respected and enforced on its territory, in particular by establishing stricter controls at its borders with the Democratic Republic of the Congo to curtail the illegal crossborder trafficking of natural resources and arms and the movement of combatants.

31. Urge the Government to improve its cooperation with the Group of Experts with a view to facilitating the implementation of its mandate.

Burundi

32. Encourage the Government and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to determine the modalities of a gradual disengagement of the peacekeeping presence of ONUB, taking into account, in this phase, the merits of a United Nations contribution and support to the reconstruction and the consolidation of peace in Burundi.

33. Encourage the Government and all Burundian political actors to engage in the consolidation of peace and national reconciliation by continuing to follow the path of dialogue, power-sharing and consensus.

34. Encourage the Government to make the best use of the Forum of Partners to support reforms provided for in the Arusha Agreement and to mobilize international assistance for the reconstruction of Burundi.

35. Urge the Government to complete the implementation of the programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, including the effective reintegration of former combatants.

36. Encourage the Government to continue to engage Palipehutu-FNL with a view to bringing them into the peace process, and call upon FNL to join the peace process without further delays or conditions.

37. Encourage the Burundian authorities to continue to work with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General with a view to establishing a mechanism for ending impunity and promoting reconciliation.

Regional cooperation

38. Encourage States in the region to resolve their differences through peaceful dialogue and consultations and through the establishment of confidence-building measures and mechanisms.

39. Urge the participants in the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to maintain the current momentum so that the second summit can be held as soon as possible, and to prioritize the expected outcomes of their negotiations with a view to achieving meaningful results.

Abbreviations

CIAT	International Committee in Support of the Transition
CNDD	Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie
EUSEC	European Union Mission of Assistance for Security Sector Reform
FARDC	Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
FROBEDU	Front pour la démocratie au Burundi
FDD	Forces pour la défense de la démocratie
FDLR	Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda
FNL	Forces nationales de libération
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
UPDF	Ugandan People's Defence Forces
UPDS	Union pour le progrès et la démocratie sociale
UPRONA	Union pour le progrès national

United Nations S/2005/717

Security Council

Distr.: General
15 November 2005

Original: English

Identical notes verbales dated 14 November 2005 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

The Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to the President of the Security Council and, with reference to Security Council resolution 1636 (2005), has the honour to convey the following information on the work of the Syrian Judicial Commission as received from Judge Ghada Murad, Chairperson of the Commission:

The Commission initiated its work by studying the report of Mr. Detlev Mehlis, Commissioner of the International Independent Investigation Commission established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1595 (2005).

On 11 November 2005, the Commission sent a letter to Mr. Mehlis in which it expressed its wish to fully cooperate with the International Independent Commission. Furthermore, it extended an invitation to Mr. Mehlis to visit Syria for the implementation of this required cooperation pursuant to resolution 1636 (2005).

On 6 November 2005, the Commission sent a letter to Judge Said Merza, Prosecutor General of Lebanon, in which it requested that the Syrian Judicial Commission be provided with a copy of the investigations available to the Lebanese justice on the criminal action of assassinating the late Rafik Hariri. No reply has yet been received.

The Commission has received all information sent to it through fax or e-mail, reviewed its content and interrogated some persons who sent information useful for the investigation.

The Commission heard some Syrians whose names were mentioned in the report of Mr. Mehlis, and sent summons to others to hear them in the light of the content of the report of Mr. Mehlis.

The Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic avails himself of this opportunity to reconfirm the commitment of Syria to full cooperation with the International Independent Investigation Commission, and requests that this note be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

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United Nations S/2005/718

Security Council

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Letter dated 9 November 2005 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I would like to request your kind assistance in circulating as a document of the Council the resolution of the Parliament of Georgia of 11 October 2005 regarding the current situation in the conflict regions on the territory of Georgia and ongoing peace operations, annexed hereto.

(*Signed*) Revaz **Adamia**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

05-60445 (E) 161105

Annex to the letter dated 9 November 2005 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council*

Resolution

of the Parliament of Georgia

regarding the current situation in the conflict regions on the territory of Georgia and ongoing peace operations

The Parliament of Georgia condemns the recent developments in the conflict regions existing on the territory of Georgia (Abkhazia, and the former South Ossetian Autonomous District).

Every effort of the Georgian side, as well as of the international community to intensify the process of conflict regulation through internationally recognized democratic norms and principles to the date had not reached any tangible results. Moreover, the de facto governments in the above-mentioned regions continue to pursue a policy of open confrontation, disregarding the principles of international law and establishment of criminal regimes, instead of pursuing a course of constructive cooperation.

On the territories of Abkhazia and the former South Ossetian Autonomous District dictatorships based on the clan system and aimed at strengthening the personal power of the ruling elite and obtaining illicit income have been established.

Under the criminal and clan-based governments of these regions one can witness massive kidnapping of citizens - including children, killings, unmitigated criminal gang activity, raids and robbery of the civilian population, creation and backing of terrorist and subversive groups with the help of the Russian special services, currency counterfeiting, drug transit, trafficking of arms and people, smuggling, appropriating of assets initially belonging to the refugees, denial of the right of instruction at schools in the native language as well as of the right of IDPs and refugees to return to their homes. And all of the listed above is an incomplete record of consequences resulting from the activities of these regimes.

Furthermore, the separatist regimes continue their attempts to legitimize the results of ethnic cleansing affirmed by the Budapest, Lisbon and Istanbul Summits of the OSCE - the latest illustration of which is the *en mass* appropriation of homes of forcibly exiled Georgian population.

Clearly, the aforementioned actions have nothing in common with the protection of the ethnic rights of the population residing today on the territories of Abkhazia and the former South Ossetian Autonomous District. The criminal dictatorships currently in place pose a threat to everyone, including those they allegedly try to protect. In this regard, it is enough to mention the repressive policy of the separatist governments against those Abkhaz and Ossetian citizens who have tried to move towards public diplomacy and confidence-building – among the punished and arrested are underage children, whose only "guilt" was merely to get acquainted with Georgian kids.

Due to the existing information vacuum, repressions and anti-Georgian propaganda, the local population of both regions has no opportunity to receive and assess the information regarding the peace initiatives currently proposed by the central government of Georgia.

The fundamental rights and freedoms on the territory of Abkhazia and of the former South Ossetian Autonomous District are violated not only against internally displaced persons, but also against the

*Also circulated in document A/60/552.

remaining population. The separatist governments, manipulating issues of ethnic origins, attempt to monopolize the process of conflict regulation on behalf of their own clan-based interests, and against the fundamental interests of their population.

The question then arises – with what or whose support do separatist regimes manage to ignore the position of respectful international organizations and violate the basic norms and principles of the international law?

Regretfully, the answer to this question unambiguously indicates the role of the Russian Federation in inspiring and maintaining these conflicts, notwithstanding the fact that this country officially bears a heavy responsibility of facilitator for the conflict settlement .

Russia is a member of the Group of Friends of the UN Secretary General working on the issues of Abkhazia, Georgia, as well as an executor of the peace mission in Abkhazia under the auspices of the CIS, the Head of Quadripartite Monitoring Commission for the former Autonomous District of South Ossetia, a member of the peace mission and a participant of all agreements with respect to the conflict.

These functions are meant to create certain obligations and responsibilities for the Russian Federation within the international community. Nevertheless, the Russian Federation does nothing to promote the process of conflict settlement on the territory of Georgia – quite the contrary. Steps made by the Russian Federation presently strengthens the separatist regimes and de facto annexation of a part of Georgia's territory. Following are some examples:

- Despite the numerous protests from the Government of Georgia and an explicitly negative position of international organizations, the central government of Russia, in violation of all international norms, continues to grant Russian citizenship *en masse* to the population remaining in the conflict zones through simplified administrative procedures;

- Similarly, despite several protests from the Government of Georgia and the explicitly negative position of international organizations, the central government of Russia, under a unilateral decision, introduced a visa regime towards the conflict zones that differs from that imposed on the rest of the Georgian territory (in fact, a visa-free regime);

- In violation of the principles of international law, agreements reached in the CIS framework, and the Georgian legislation, citizens of Russia have been appointed to the high-level positions (i.e. Prime-Minister, Ministers of Defense and Law Enforcement, commanders of military units etc.) in Tskhinvali and Sukhumi – individuals who simultaneously continue to work in law enforcement and the special services of the Russian Federation;

- Without consulting or negotiating with the Georgian government, various high-level delegations of the Russian Federation, including federal delegations, frequently visit Sokhumi and Tskhinvali, conclude agreements and treaties and launch projects of a great political importance (e.g. Moscow-Sukhumi railway agreement);

A military parade dedicated to the celebration of the so-called "Independence Day" on September 20th, 2005 in Tskhinvali, during which separatists demonstrated large amount of military equipment, has become a special indignation. The very existence of this equipment is in violation of both the Sochi Agreement of 14 June of 1992 as well as of the Document on Demilitarization signed in Sochi in 2004, where, in both cases, Russia has an obligation of guarantor. The parade displayed barefaced impudence not only against the Georgian Government, but also against the international organizations involved in the conflict settlement and demilitarization processes in the region.

The Parliament of Georgia demands answer to the question: from where and how did numerous pieces of new Russian heavy military equipment appear on the territory of the former South Ossetian Autonomous District, the entire administrative perimeter of which borders only rest of Georgia and of the Russian Federation? Obviously, not from the Georgian side. This equipment, as well as the frequent military exercises, is a visible part of the hidden arms race carried out by the Russian Federation in the conflict regions of Georgia. This process is so evident that it is often covered by Russian TV channels. The parade in Tskhinvali once again demonstrated the reason why the Russian Government opposes the demand of the Georgian Government for the international community to maintain control over the Roki Tunnel connecting the Russian Federation with the Tskhinvali Region. These events once again proved that the Russian peace-keeping forces deployed in the region, neither by their format nor by ideology, do not serve the purpose of conflict resolution and demilitarization of the region.

Open political and military support enable the separatist governments to ignore the position of the international community and continue obstruction of the peace process. It is clear that the Russian Federation does not possess the political will to promote the process of conflict settlement on the Georgian territory.

Accordingly, the Parliament of Georgia declares:

An end should be put to the existence of "white spots" of democracy, of criminal enclaves and dictatorial regimes, and of violations of fundamental human rights and freedoms on the territory of Georgia.

The Parliament of Georgia deems it necessary to reach rapid progress in the process of peaceful political settlement of the conflicts existing on the territory of Georgia.

The Parliament of Georgia reaffirms that in the united Georgia the entire spectrum of rights and freedoms will be guaranteed to every Abkhaz and Ossetian citizen and the necessary conditions will be provided for the protection of their identity and development.

The Parliament of Georgia remains hopeful that the Government of the Russian Federation will be able to overcome the legacy of imperialistic political stereotypes and play active role in peaceful settlement of conflicts, thus proving that the Russian Federation has the will to be a worthy partner of the democratic community.

In view of aforementioned, the Parliament of Georgia resolves:

1. To assess the activity of and fulfillment of the current mandate by the peace-keeping forces dislocated in Abkhazia and the former South Ossetian Autonomous District as extremely negative;

2. To instruct the Government of Georgia to intensify negotiations with the Russian Federation, international organizations and interested countries on issues regarding the fulfillment of obligations undertaken by the peace-keeping forces on the territory of the former South Ossetian Autonomous District and report to the Parliament on the situation by 10 February 2006;

3. To instruct the Government of Georgia to intensify negotiations with the Russian Federation, international organizations and interested countries on issues regarding the fulfillment of obligations undertaken by peace-keeping forces on the territory of Abkhazia and report to the Parliament on the situation by 1 July 2006;

4. The Parliament of Georgia, in the event that the processes provided for in Paragraph 2 are negatively assessed and no progress is witnessed, shall demand cessation of the peace-keeping

operation on the territory of the former South Ossetian Autonomous District, as well as denunciation of the relevant international agreements and abolition of the existing structures starting from 15 February 2006;

5. The Parliament of Georgia, in the event that the processes provided for in Paragraph 3 are negatively assessed and no progress is witnessed, shall demand cessation of the peace-keeping operation on the territory of Abkhazia, as well as denunciation of the relevant international agreements and abolition of the existing structures starting from 15 July 2006;

6. To instruct the Government of Georgia, in the event of enactment of Paragraphs 4 and/or 5 of this Resolution, with the task of undertaking appropriate measures for the rapid withdrawal of the Russian peace-keeping forces, acting within their relevant mandate, from the territory of Georgia, as well as cooperating with every relevant organization in order to ensure peace and stability in the conflict zones;

7. To instruct the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia to inform international organizations and interested States about the Resolution of the Parliament of Georgia, and to intensify work aimed at seeking support for the peace initiatives of Georgia and launching new peace operations;

8. To instruct the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the office of the Prosecutor General of Georgia to prosecute foreign citizens who reside illegally on the territory of Georgia and hold political, administrative or other positions in the de facto governments of Abkhazia and former South Ossetian Autonomous District;

9. To instruct the Government of Georgia to submit by 1 December 2005 a detailed road map for the implementation of the South Ossetian conflict settlement peace plan initiated by the President of Georgia with due regard to the political, security, economic, social, legal, educational, cultural and other aspects;

10. To instruct the Government of Georgia to submit similar detailed road map for implementation of the peace plan for Abkhazian conflict by 1 May 2006;

11. The Parliament of Georgia shall start consultations with international organizations, interested States, members of civil society in Abkhazia and the former South Ossetian Autonomous District and international experts in order to elaborate and adopt relevant amendments to the Constitution, as well as other legal acts, including a law on restitution.

(signed)
Nino Burjanadze
Chair of the Parliament of Georgia

Tbilisi
11 October 2005

United Nations S/2005/719

Security Council

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Monthly report of the Secretary-General on Darfur

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraphs 6, 13 and 16 of Security Council resolution 1556 (2004), paragraph 15 of resolution 1564 (2004), paragraph 17 of resolution 1574 (2004) and paragraph 12 of resolution 1590 (2005).

II. Insecurity in Darfur

2. The past month coincided with the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, a period that usually enjoys a respite from conflict and violence, much as we witnessed in Darfur during Ramadan in 2004. Unfortunately, in my report for the month of September 2005 (S/2005/650), I described a sharp increase in violence that included clashes between the parties, attacks on villages and a further deterioration in security due to widespread banditry and lawlessness. Overall, the month of October saw a continuation of this extremely worrying trend.

3. At the same time, the frequency and intensity of direct clashes between the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and Government forces decreased relative to the previous month. Nevertheless, serious engagements were reported, such as the clash near Kutum, northern Darfur, at mid-month that resulted in dead and wounded among civilians and combatants and prompted more civilian displacements. Both SLM/A and the Government continue to show a chronic disregard for both the letter and the spirit of the ceasefire agreements they have signed.

4. According to the African Union (AU), most alleged violations of the ceasefire were attributable to the SLM/A. However, AU has reported that there were attacks during October by Government forces, operating either in apparent coordination with militia groups or alone, on villages such as Kabga and Um Bulli (both in northern Darfur). The Government's responsibilities in this regard are clear: it must prevent attacks on civilians by its own forces; and, it must immediately disarm the various militia groups, whether Government-aligned or independent, who continue to kill and loot with impunity.

5. The past month also saw attacks by militia on villages. In one particularly vicious incident on 23 October, militia carried out an attack on the Fur village of *Tama (southern Darfur)* that left dozens of civilians dead and many more injured.

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Some 240 families who fled to Amkassara, a village about 37 kilometres north of Nyala, have been unable to return to harvest their crops. By 31 October, the attackers were still occupying Tama. It is deeply disturbing that this kind of forced displacement, which occurred on a massive scale in the early phases of the conflict in Darfur, continues to this day, with no apparent efforts being made by the Government to put a stop to those terrible crimes.

6. As was the case in September, the security situation in western Darfur remained very precarious in October. Even after promises by the State Government to implement joint military and police patrols on the highways in order to ensure security, lawlessness and banditry have reached such dangerous levels that all roads out of Geneina remain open to United Nations staff only with approved armed escorts. The tense situation within Geneina itself warranted a reduction of non-essential United Nations personnel on 12 October. The limited freedom of movement for United Nations staff in western Darfur has affected the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The deployment by the Government of additional police resources in October was a welcome step but the Government in Khartoum and the State Government must do much more to ensure that rule of law prevails.

7. The poor security situation in western Darfur is compounded by issues that straddle the Sudan-Chad border. Reports of defections from the Chadian army have highlighted the risk of transborder tribal ties internationalizing the conflict in Darfur. Moreover, criminal cross-border activities add yet one more dimension to the already challenging security environment. I call on the Governments of both the Sudan and Chad to pursue energetically strategies that will minimize the overspill of issues from one neighbour into the other, which might either complicate security issues for one or both countries and/or interfere with the work of humanitarian agencies operating in the border region.

8. The month of October also marked a terrible milestone for the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS). On 8 October, five members of an AMIS patrol were killed — the mission's first such deaths — during a firefight with an armed group that had earlier ambushed and killed two civilian contractors in southern Darfur. The AMIS patrol stated that the attackers appeared to be members of the SLM/A, while the movement's leadership denied any involvement. This tragic event was followed the next day by a large-scale, though short-term, detention of AMIS personnel and advisers by a splinter faction of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) near Tine, northern Darfur.

9. In yet another incident, an AMIS patrol was shot at near Tama, southern Darfur, on 27 October by unknown gunmen. This attack did not result in casualties. This unmistakable escalation of targeted violence against AMIS underscores the serious dangers and risks facing the AU force and the need for all parties to take the necessary measures to guarantee the safety and security of AU personnel in Darfur. I pay tribute to the courage and determination of the AU Mission in performing its vital mandate in Darfur.

10. In my June 2005 report on the situation in Darfur (S/2005/467), I highlighted the relative decrease in the number of deaths due to violence since early 2005. However, the months of September and October 2005 have recorded a rise in the number of people being killed in the region. In my next report, and after having analysed the relevant data, I will provide a clearer picture as to what degree those

two months have reversed the declining trend of deaths due to violence that had characterized most of 2005.

11. During the first days of November, just after the end of this reporting period, an incident occurred that resulted in the violation of the freedom of movement of members of the panel of experts appointed by the Security Council to monitor the implementation of Security Council resolution 1591 (2005). The incident took place during the panel's latest visit to El Fasher. This is the second time members of the panel have been harassed by Government security agents in Darfur. My Special Representative sent a démarche regarding the incident to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 8 November. A follow-up meeting was held with the State Minister on 10 November. The Minister admitted that the behaviour of military intelligence "had been wrong". He assured my Special Representative that the panel members have freedom of movement in the pursuit of their mandated activities, and he made a commitment to ensuring that the court case against the United Nations security officer who had accompanied the panel members would be dismissed.

III. Protection and human rights

12. The ongoing violence caused a further displacement of civilian populations to camps. During October, thousands of civilians throughout the Darfur region fled to the outskirts of their villages, makeshift settlements and camps for internally displaced persons. The Zam Zam camp in northern Darfur absorbed the largest single influx of newly displaced persons, with over 6,000 new arrivals in October alone.

13. Farmers are also continuously harassed by militia and nomadic groups. In the Um Kadada area, northern Darfur, reports were rife on thefts of farm produce by militia, and in Singita, Dulu and Karande, south of Kass, southern Darfur, villagers have reported harassment by nomads and militia in the form of looting, banditry and the forced payment of protection "taxes". Repercussions resulting from the non-payment of such taxes include the deliberate destruction of planted fields. Similar incidents were reported in Wadi Salih and Mukjar, western Darfur, where farmers complained of destroyed crops with no efforts or interventions from the authorities to protect them.

14. My previous monthly report on Darfur (S/2005/650) made reference to the commercial blockade by the Government of the Kalma camp for internally displaced persons in southern Darfur that has now been in place for five months. The blockade, which prevents the flow of critical goods and materials into the camp, seriously violates a significant number of provisions of international human rights and humanitarian law, including provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. My Special Representative and his colleagues continue to seek the earliest removal of the blockade at both the local and state levels but the blockade remains in place and continues to have deleterious effects on the population. This situation is unacceptable, and I strongly urge the Government to lift the blockade without any further delay or precondition.

15. As the Council is aware, Kalma camp was a source of concern in October for two other reasons. First, on 23 October, Government police and national security officials entered the camp without providing prior notification to AMIS, aggressively forced their way into an international non-governmental organization's

compound with weapons drawn and arrested two national staff members without any apparent cause. Second, and subsequent to the police raid, a large group of national staff members of international non-governmental organizations and local water authority employees were taken hostage by Kalma inhabitants in a protest over the arrest by the authorities of a sheikh within the camp. The situation was eventually resolved, but I strongly condemn this or any attack on or threat to humanitarian workers. All such attacks are contrary to international humanitarian law. Both the Government and internally displaced persons should respect humanitarian workers and the property of non-governmental organizations. In addition, due process and international human rights standards, which are an essential element of the Interim National Constitution, must be fully respected in any judicial proceedings following those events.

16. The upsurge in violence against civilian populations in Darfur seriously affected children. During the month of October, several children were killed and abducted in the region. In addition, despite my repeated expressions of concern on various occasions on the matter of child combatants, all parties continue to recruit children. I have again received troubling reports of children participating in hostilities in northern Darfur.

17. During the reporting period, the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) continued to document cases of serious violence against women and girls on a weekly basis. The problem of sexual and gender-based violence was particularly troubling in western Darfur, where UNMIS documented 21 cases: nine cases of rape, four cases of attempted rape and eight cases of assault. In one of the cases, two women informed United Nations human rights officers that on 2 October, a group of 10 armed men wearing khaki uniforms and riding horses and camels had raped them and four other women outside the Mornei camp for internally displaced persons. In another case, the victim was 15 years old. Not only am I deeply troubled about those reported abuses but it is also distressing that the victims continue to be reluctant to notify the police of incidents out of fear of retaliation and a lack of confidence in the authorities' capacity and willingness to conduct proper investigations.

18. At the same time, during the month of October, UNMIS was granted greater access to detention facilities in Darfur. In addition to accessing regular prison facilities, the State Director of National Security in Nyala (southern Darfur) allowed UNMIS to visit the town's national security detention facility for the first time. Of the five detainees interviewed by UNMIS, however, four reported being beaten during interrogations by members of the national security apparatus.

IV. Humanitarian situation

19. It is expected that the number of people affected by the crisis in Darfur, which has stabilized at 3.4 million, will decline over the next months as the resident populations who have been able to cultivate crops will benefit from improved harvests. The combination of good rains and an increased percentage of the population being active make it likely that the harvest will improve as compared to last season. A large proportion of the vulnerable population will remain dependent on food aid, however, with a cereal deficit forecasted to be between 374,000 and

507,000 tons in 2006. Only 20 per cent of the vulnerable resident populations have adequate food supplies from their own means, compared with 46 per cent in 2004.

20. During October, the number of internally displaced persons diminished slightly to 1.75 million as a result of new registrations and some small-scale returns. Since re-registrations began in March 2005, the internally displaced population has dropped by over 200,000. The new headcount in Kalma camp on 4 October, after six months of obstructive behaviour from authorities and sheikhs within the camps, indicated that the camp population is 87,000, substantially less than the working figure of 130,000 previously used. Nevertheless, Kalma is still the largest single camp for displaced persons in Darfur. A number of internally displaced persons have left the camps for the agricultural season. According to the Emergency Food Security and Nutrition Survey of Darfur undertaken in September by the World Food Programme, the United Nations Children's Fund and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 19 per cent of internally displaced persons in camps have been active in agricultural activities. However, for the vast majority of those displaced people, access to land remains uncertain or impossible. It is expected that their total numbers will remain largely the same until the next planting season starts in early 2006, despite the recent surge in violence.

21. The survey also confirmed overall general progress in the humanitarian situation, as indicated earlier in various assessments and surveys. Average malnutrition rates have dropped since last year, from 21.8 per cent to 11.9 per cent this year, with severe malnutrition rates dropping to 1.4 per cent, down from 3.9 per cent in 2004. Similarly, the global acute malnutrition rate for children dropped from 21.8 per cent in 2004 to 11.9 per cent in 2005. The mortality rate decreased from 0.72 last year to 0.48 this year, well below the crisis threshold of 1 death per 10,000 persons per day. Child mortality and malnutrition rates likewise improved. The overall crude mortality for children under the age of five dropped from 1.03 deaths per 10,000 persons per day in 2004 to 0.71 in 2005.

22. The improved indicators are the direct result of the consistent and concerted efforts on the part of the humanitarian community, resulting in better conditions in all life-saving sectors. It is important to emphasize that those improvements do not mean that overall food security concerns have been addressed. The situation remains fragile and largely dependent on the delivery of humanitarian assistance. If access to affected populations becomes limited, the situation will take a turn for the worse. There are concrete examples of this scenario. In those areas which have been less accessible, such as areas held by SLM/A, the humanitarian situation is still very worrying. The improvements can only hold if road insecurity does not make it impossible to bring relief to those in need. In that respect, relief operations experienced new setbacks in October.

23. Armed clashes and banditry in western Darfur have placed severe limitations on the movement of the humanitarian community in Geneina; all roads out of the town are restricted for humanitarian traffic and non-essential United Nations, and some staff of international non-governmental organizations have been relocated. In southern Darfur, the security situation is very tense north, east and south of Nyala, with incidents of banditry occurring on a daily basis. Only in northern Darfur does United Nations accessibility remain reasonably high, despite attacks on villages and towns that occasionally force international non-governmental organizations to withdraw their staff. United Nations access throughout Darfur has decreased to

roughly 80 per cent in September and to less than 75 per cent in October (the lowest rate since April 2004). Moreover, the increasing violence to which the AU protection force is subjected casts doubt on the capacity of the humanitarian community to operate under precarious security circumstances.

24. Despite promises made to the United Nations in July 2005, elements of SLM/A have resorted again to the abduction of staff members of a national non-governmental organization. After lengthy talks, the three people abducted were released unharmed. I insist that SLM/A, other groups and the Government respect the neutrality of humanitarian organizations and refrain from disrupting assistance to the vulnerable populations in Darfur. It should be noted that Government authorities in Darfur often obstruct the implementation of humanitarian work. Since the signing of the joint communiqué in July 2004, there are still no Darfur-wide rules that provide for unrestricted travel for humanitarian staff, who continue to depend on local ad hoc decisions.

V. Darfur peace process

25. The sixth round of the inter-Sudanese peace talks on Darfur held in Abuja ended on 20 October following weeks of difficult AU negotiations among the Government, SLM/A and JEM. At the closing session, a joint communiqué was adopted by the parties which expressed their commitment "to make the next round", due to start on 21 November, "a decisive one". Although the talks did not make as much progress as had been hoped for, a number of positive developments took place during the negotiations despite the background of ongoing violence in Darfur.

26. The talks in Abuja were preceded by workshops that took place from 15 to 21 September 2005, on power-sharing, wealth-sharing and security arrangements. The start of the actual negotiations, which were to be held immediately following the workshops, suffered delays due to the dispute over the legitimacy of the SLM/A representatives to the talks. Whereas the SLM/A chairman, Abdul Wahid, had sent a list of delegates to the talks, the Secretary-General of the movement, Mini Minawi, presented a separate list, claiming that the first one was not representative. A group of 10 field commanders, representing different tribal groups, and 3 representatives from Minawi's office in Asmara arrived in Abuja on 25 September 2005, stressing the "neutrality" of their group in the ongoing disagreement between the SLM/A Chairman and Secretary-General and promising to promote unity within the movement. Despite week-long consultations, the SLM/A leadership failed to find a compromise on this issue. Difficulties between the two factions of the rebel group continued later in the month. On 29 October, an SLM reconciliation conference was convened in northern Darfur. While Mini Minawi attended the conference, Abdul Wahid did not, but sent a delegation which sought to delay the conference.

27. Despite the SLM split, the AU mediation went ahead and started the talks on 3 October, first with the power-sharing commission. Discussions on wealth-sharing and the security commission began only towards the end of the session.

28. Although negotiations on the three main elements of the talks should have been conducted in parallel, SLM/A and JEM, who formed a united delegation throughout the talks, cited a lack of capacity within the movements to discuss some of them, in particular wealth-sharing. Nevertheless, before the adjournment of the talks, the agenda on wealth-sharing was adopted.

29. Despite the difficulties faced at the beginning of the sixth round, some progress was made, especially with the first three of nine items on the power-sharing agenda: general principles on power-sharing; human rights and fundamental freedoms; and the criteria and guidelines for power-sharing. Furthermore, discussions began on the fourth agenda item, the federal system and all levels of Government, although the positions of the two still differed considerably. In particular, there are lingering concerns that the movements may continue to withhold their recognition of either the Comprehensive Peace Agreement or the Interim National Constitution on the grounds that they were not party to their negotiation. Until the resumption of the next round of talks on or about 20 November, the mediation will be consulting the parties on this and other outstanding issues, including the Darfur-Darfur dialogue.

30. After a long break since its last meeting in February 2005, the ninth meeting of the Joint Commission established by the N'djamena Protocol of 8 April 2004 was held in the Chadian capital on 13 and 14 October. The meeting took place in parallel to the Abuja talks, and both meetings influenced each other positively.

31. During the meeting, the Government and SLM/A came under heavy criticism for significant ceasefire violations, while militia groups were also criticized for attacks on civilians. It was noted that no progress had been made by the Government to disarm the Janjaweed and that the movements had failed to identify their positions and separate their forces on the ground. The Commission urged the parties to give written indications of their respective positions to the Ceasefire Commission; reiterated its call for the immediate disarmament of the Janjaweed; and urged the Government to allow the entry into Darfur of 105 armoured personnel carriers made available by Canada to AMIS. However, the Government signalled its readiness to allow only 35 armoured personnel carriers into the region but indicated a willingness to consider the entry of the remaining 70. Finally, it was agreed that the Joint Commission would meet on a regular basis, perhaps monthly.

32. To ensure the success of this vital process, continued coordination among international partners is required. The time has also come for all stakeholders to coordinate closely all those activities which will have to be carried out after a successful conclusion of the peace talks. They include: bridging the relief-development gap; assisting voluntary returns; ceasefire monitoring; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; policing; and rule of law and human rights monitoring. Moreover, the Darfur-Darfur dialogue and reconciliation are core issues that should be addressed both during and after the talks if the peace settlement is to be truly inclusive.

33. The support of the international community for a Darfur peace agreement will also depend on a number of factors, including its broad consistency with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Interim National Constitution and respect for the constitutional arrangements worked out for the southern Sudan; its potential application to other conflict areas in the country, such as eastern Sudan; and the inclusion of measures to effectively enforce a permanent ceasefire in Darfur. Those requirements and a unified SLM/A as a credible negotiating partner and the inclusion of the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) in the Government of National Unity's policymaking regarding Darfur, are issues that the Sudanese and the international community should focus on as a matter of priority before the interval until the next session.

34. With the above in mind, my Special Representative, Jan Pronk, organized a meeting of special envoys to the Darfur peace process in Khartoum on 11 November. Special envoys and representatives of the African Union, Canada, the European Union, France, Germany, the League of Arab States, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America were invited to participate.

VI. United Nations support to the African Union Mission in Sudan

35. By the end of October, the total strength of AMIS had reached 6,706. Of this figure, 699 were military observers, 4,878 were protection force troops, 1,191 were civilian police officers, 27 were international civilian staff and 11 staff were assigned to support the Ceasefire Commission. After a brief suspension in September, the build-up of the mission proceeded in October.

36. With the AU Mission approaching its authorized strength of 6,171 military personnel and 1,560 civilian police, the AU Commission is now focusing on ensuring that AMIS can reach its full operational capability. While the AU Mission continues to actively conduct its patrols and monitoring activities, its already enormously challenging tasks have been made considerably difficult by the attacks on its personnel that occurred in October, inaction by the Government on disarming the Janjaweed and continued logistical difficulties.

37. The United Nations continued to extend its active cooperation and strong support to the African Union throughout October. A team from United Nations Headquarters is currently running a three-week course for staff officers from AU member countries in Addis Ababa. The 42 participants in the course will constitute the core of staff officers for AMIS and AU headquarters in the future. The United Nations is also continuing its efforts to facilitate African Union efforts to secure fuel supplies for AMIS.

38. From 13 to 18 October, the team leader of the United Nations assistance cell to AU, Major-General Henry Anyidoho (Rtd.), accompanied a delegation from AU headquarters on their visit to Darfur, which was dispatched to the region from Addis Ababa, to demonstrate solidarity with AMIS troops, to encourage them to carry on with their duties despite the recent attacks and detentions and to advise on major operational matters.

VII. Observations

39. The dangerous increase in violence in Darfur has extended into its second month, seriously affecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance, claiming the lives of civilians and AMIS personnel and further reducing the initially improved prospects for the return of internally displaced persons in some areas. Civilians were again displaced from their villages, in some cases for the second or third time. Moreover, the looming threat of complete lawlessness and anarchy draws nearer, particularly in western Darfur, as warlords, bandits and militia groups grow more aggressive.

40. A further deterioration of the situation can be averted only by rapidly consolidating of the progress made at the sixth round of talks in Abuja. A political

solution is paramount, and to achieve one the Sudanese and the international community must coordinate their collective efforts towards two specific goals. First, they need to lay the groundwork for a successful conclusion to the forthcoming seventh round of the Abuja peace talks. This round should be final. It is crucial that a framework peace agreement be concluded before the end of the year. Second, it is imperative that, in coordination with the Sudanese parties, the international community immediately begin to plan the programmes and assistance that will be necessary to ensure the successful implementation of any peace agreement reached at the negotiating table in Abuja.

41. International partners will have a number of opportunities to coordinate and reinforce strategies and messages prior to the resumption of the Abuja process in November. Critical elements of any coordinated approach should focus on repairing the rift within SLM/A, conducting structured and dynamic consultations between the AU mediation team and the parties on outstanding issues with regard to the power-sharing commission, and encouraging the involvement of the SPLM elements of the Government of National Unity. The United Nations is prepared to assist in finalizing the negotiations. At the same time, it should be made clear to all parties that the AU-facilitated peace talks in Abuja are the only vehicle for achieving a viable solution. Talks outside of this framework, where some of the parties are excluded, will never lead to any sustainable agreements.

42. The international community will also have a key role in helping to implement any agreement that is reached by the parties. The African Union, the United Nations, other international organizations and partner Governments that have been supporting AU mediation efforts in Darfur would be well advised to begin immediate substantive planning so as to be prepared to lend the type and level of assistance that will be required to implement an agreement. The broad nature of this assistance is already well understood — including in the areas of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, initial recovery activities and support for reconciliation efforts. The time has come to start concrete planning without any delay to bring to life a peace agreement that may be within the parties' reach. The people of Darfur deserve not only to achieve peace at the negotiating table as soon as possible but also to rapidly consolidate it through a well planned and well resourced implementation process. Both the Government of the Sudan and its international partners should urgently mobilize themselves in this regard. I reiterate that the United Nations will provide its full support and cooperation for these vital endeavours.

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Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Sixtieth year

Identical letters dated 15 November 2005 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Over the past three weeks, Israel, the occupying Power, has escalated its military aggression against the Palestine people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. In particular, the occupying Power has intensified its campaign of extrajudicial killings of Palestinian civilians, in flagrant violation of international law, and has persisted with its incursions and military assaults against Palestinian cities and villages, resulting in the death of at least 13 Palestinians, including 9 children, and the injury of tens of other innocent civilians.

Additionally, top officials in the Israeli Government, including Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, have been making highly inflammatory statements against the Palestinian leadership and future peace prospects. The actions and statements undertaken by Israel, the occupying Power, have only served to undermine and obstruct the serious efforts made by the Palestinian Authority to secure and maintain the ceasefire and achieve progress on other tracks of the road map, including the upcoming Palestinian legislative elections.

Among the numerous incidents of Palestinians, in particular children, being killed by the Israeli occupying forces over the past three weeks was the tragic death of 12-year-old Ahmad Al-Khatib. On Thursday, 3 November 2005, as the Palestinian people were celebrating the end of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, Israeli occupying forces raided the West Bank town of Qabataya. During the raid, Ahmad was fatally shot by Israeli occupying forces while playing with his friends outside his home. After two days of suffering, Ahmad passed away. Upon the praiseworthy request of Ahmad's family, his organs were donated to save the lives of six Israeli children "for the sake of peace between peoples".

In addition to the scenes of death and destruction that the Palestinian people have had to bear following each Israeli military assault over the past three weeks, they have also had to endure inflammatory statements repeatedly issued by members

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of the Israeli Government. These statements, which either attack the Palestinian leadership and doubt its intentions or discredit the internationally endorsed road map, spread hopelessness and increase animosity among the Palestinian population.

In this connection, on 28 October 2005, the Israeli Minister of Defense, Shaul Mofaz, declared to the largely circulated Israeli daily *Yediot Ahronot* that he doubted highly that a peace accord could be reached with the present generation of Palestinian leaders. The minister went as far as to say that Israelis would have to wait "for the next generation" to reach peace with the Palestinians. Adding to such inflammatory and disappointing comments, the Israeli Prime Minister declared to the Knesset three days later that the Israeli commitment to the road map was "conditional" on the 14 Israeli reservations forwarded by his Government. Moreover, the Israeli Prime Minister continued to interfere flagrantly in internal Palestinian affairs when he openly discussed his intention to obstruct the upcoming legislative elections if Hamas participated in them.

Israel, the occupying Power, has further complicated the already difficult situation by declaring its intention to spend generously on its illegal settlement activities, especially in occupied East Jerusalem, in addition to continuing the construction of its illegal wall. The declared plans for further expanding the so-called "greater Jerusalem", which includes linking the illegal settlement of "Maale Adumim" with occupied East Jerusalem, will effectively slice the West Bank into two disconnected parts, making the creation of a contiguous and viable Palestinian State virtually impossible. Such plans are in flagrant violation of international law, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, rendered on 9 July 2004, as well as Israel's obligations according to the road map.

The fact that Israel continues to launch such aggressions and to carry out its illegal policies and practices against the Palestinian people is undoubtedly attributable to the fact that it has been permitted by the international community time and again to act with impunity, without consequence for its actions. Thus, the international community must reiterate its call upon Israel, the occupying Power, to abide by all of its legal obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law, and must act decisively in case of continued non-compliance.

The present letter is in follow-up to our previous 225 letters to you regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, since 28 September 2000. These letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 28 October 2005 (A/ES-10/311-S/2005/685) constitute a basic record of the crimes committed by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people since September 2000. For all of these war crimes, State terrorism and systematic human rights violations committed against the Palestinian people, Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.

Accordingly, in follow-up to the above-mentioned letters, it is my profound regret to inform you that since our last letter to you, at least 19 more Palestinians have been killed by the Israeli occupying forces, raising the total number of martyrs killed since September 2000 to 3,774. (The names of the martyrs that have been identified are listed in the annex to the present letter.)

I would be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Riyad **Mansour**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations

Annex to the identical letters dated 15 November 2005 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Names of martyrs killed by the Israeli occupying forces in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem* Thursday, 27 October to Monday, 14 November 2005)

Thursday, 27 October 2005

1. Mohamad Kandeel (16 years old)
2. Mohamad Al-Razayna

Friday, 28 October 2005

Majed Matate

Sunday, 30 October 2005

1. Jihad Mohamad Zakarna
2. Arsheed Ahmad Tawfiq Kamile

Tuesday, 1 November 2005

1. Hassan Attiya Al-Madhoune
2. Fawzi Mohamad Abu Al-Qorae

Wednesday, 2 November 2005

Raafat Moussa Torkmane

Friday, 4 November 2005

1. Ahmad Ismail Al-Khatib (12 years old)
2. Mohamad Hichum Assaf Kamile

Monday, 7 November 2005

Hani Awda Abu Sawawine

Tuesday, 8 November 2005

Mohamad Hamdi Abu Saliha (15 years old)

Wednesday, 9 November 2005

1. Samir Ribhi Ahmad Dary
2. Akram Abu Gadabeene

Thursday, 10 November 2005

Facel Abu Arram

* The total number of Palestinian martyrs killed by the Israeli occupying forces since 28 September 2000 is 3,774.

Saturday, 12 November 2005

Bilal Waked Al-Shaer (17 years old)

Sunday, 13 November 2005

Shojae Balaoui

Monday, 14 November 2005

Amjad Al-Hannaoui